SECT。1 Justice，Whether a Natural or Artificial Virtue
I have already hinted，that our sense of every kind of virtue is not natural；but that there are some virtues，that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an artifice or contrivance，which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind。Of this kind I assert justice to be；and shall endeavour to defend this opinion by a short，and，I hope，convincing argument，before I examine the nature of the artifice，from which the sense of that virtue is derived。
It is evident，that when we praise any actions，we regard only the motives that pro-duced them，and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper。The external performance has no merit。We must look within to find the moral quality。This we cannot do directly；and therefore fix our attention on actions，as on external signs。But these actions are still considered as signs；and the ultimate ob-ject of our praise and approbation is the motive，that produced them。
After the same manner，when we require any action，or blame a person for not per-forming it，we always suppose，that one in that situation should be influenced by the proper motive of that action，and we esteem it vicious in him to be regardless of it。If we find，upon enquiry，that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast，though checked in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us，we retract our blame，and have the same esteem for him，as if he had actually performed the action，which we require of him。
It appears，therefore，that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives，and are considered merely as signs of those motives。From this principle I con-clude，that the first virtuous motive，which bestows a merit on any action，can never be a regard to the virtue of that action。but must be some other natural motive or principle。To suppose，that the mere regard to the virtue of the action。may be the first motive，which produced the action，and rendered it virtuous，is to reason in a circle。Before we can have such a regard，the action must be really virtuous；and this virtue must be de-rived from some virtuous motive：And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action。A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous。An action must be virtuous，before we can have a regard to its virtue。Some virtuous motive，therefore，must be antecedent to that regard。
Nor is this merely a metaphysical subtilty；but enters into all our reasonings in common life，though perhaps we may not be able to place it in such distinct philosophi-cal terms。We blame a father for neglecting his child。Why？because it shews a want of natural affection，which is the duty of every parent。Were not natural affection a duty，the care of children could not be a duty；and it were impossible we cou d have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring。In this case，therefore，all men sup-pose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty。
Here is a man，that does many benevolent actions；relieves the distressed，com-forts the afflicted，and extends his bounty even to the greatest strangers。No character can be more amiable and virtuous。We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest hu-manity。This humanity bestows a merit on the actions。A regard to this merit is，there-fore，a secondary consideration，and derived from the antecedent principle of humanity，which is meritorious and laudable。
In short，it may be established as an undoubted maxim，that no action can be vir-tuous，or morally good，unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it，dis-tinct from the sense of its morality。
For it is a plain fallacy to say，that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest，and at the same time that a regard to the honesty is the motive of the action。We can never have a regard to the virtue of an action，unless the action be antecedently vir-tuous。No action can be virtuous，but so far as it proceeds from a virtuous motive。A virtuous motive，therefore，must precede the regard to the virtue，and it is impossible，that the virtuous motive and the regard to the virtue can be the same。
It is requisite，then，to find some motive to acts of justice and honesty，distinct from our regard to the honesty；and in this lies the great difficulty。For should we say，that a concern for our private interest or reputation is the legitimate motive to all honest actions；it would follow，that wherever that concern ceases，honesty can no longer have place。But it is certain，that self-love，when it acts at its liberty，instead of engaging us to honest actions，is the source of all injustice and violence；nor can a man ever cor-rect those vices，without correcting and restraining the natural movements of that appe-tite。
In general，it may be affirmed，that there is no such passion in human minds，asthe love of mankind，merely as such，independent of personal qualities，of services，or of relation to ourself。It is true，there is no human，and indeed no sensible，creature，whose happiness or misery does not，in some measure，affect us when brought near to us，and represented in lively colours：But this proceeds merely from sympathy，and is no proof of such an universal affection to mankind，since this concern extends itself be-yond our own species。An affection betwixt the sexes is a passion evidently implanted in human nature；and this passion not only appears in its peculiar symptoms，but also in inflaming every other principle of affection，and raising a stronger love from beauty，wit，kindness，than what would otherwise flow from them。Were there an universal love a-mong all human creatures，it would appear after the same manner。Any degree of a good quality would cause a stronger affection than the same degree of a bad quality would cause hatred；contrary to what we find by experience。Men s tempers are different，and some have a propensity to the tender，and others to the rougher，affections：But in the main，we may affirm，that man in general，or human nature，is nothing but the object both of love and hatred，and requires some other cause，which by a double relation of impressions and ideas，may excite these passions。In vain would we endeavor to elude this hypothesis。There are no phenomena that point out any such kind affection to men，independent of their merit，and every other circumstance。We love company in general；but it is as we love any other amusement。
A rich man lies under a moral obligation to communicate to those in necessity a share of his superfluities。Were private benevolence the original motive to justice，a man would not be obliged to leave others in the possession of more than he is obliged to give them。At least the difference would be very inconsiderable。Men generally fix their af-fections more on what they are possessed of，than on what they never enjoyed：For this reason，it would be greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing，than not to give it him。But who will assert，that this is the only foundation of justice？
From all this it follows，that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity，but the very equity and merit of that observance；and as no action can be equitable or meritorious，where it cannot arise from some separate motive，there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle。Unless，therefore，we will allow，that nature has established a sophistry，and rendered it necessary and unavoidable，we must allow，that the sense of justice and injustice is not derived from nature，but arises artifi-cially，though necessarily from education，and human conventions。
To avoid giving offence，I must here observe，that when I deny justice to be a natu-ral virtue，I make use of the word，natural，only as opposed to artificial。In another sense of the word；as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of vir-tue；so no virtue is more natural than justice。Mankind is an inventive species；and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary，it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles，without the in-tervention of thought or reflection。Though the rules of justice be artificial，they are not arbitrary。Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature；if by natural we understand what is common to any species，or even if we confine it to mean what is in-separable from the species。
SECT。2 Of the Origin of Justice and Property
We now proceed to examine two questions，viz。concerning the manner，in which the rules of justice are established by the artifice of men；and concerning the reasons，which determine us to attribute the observance or neglect of these rules a moral beauty and deformity。These questions will appear afterwards to be distinct。We shall begin with the former。
It is by society alone he is able to supply his defects，and raise himself up to an e-quality with his fellow-creatures，and even acquire a superiority above them。By society all his infirmities are compensated；and though in that situation his wants multiply every moment upon him，yet his abilities are still more augmented，and leave him in every re-spect more satisfied and happy，than it is possible for him，in his savage and solitary condition，ever to become。
But in order to form society，it is requisite not only that it be advantageous，but al-so that men be sensible of these advantages；and it is impossible，in their wild unculti-vated state，that by study and reflection alone，they should ever be able to attain this knowledge。Most fortunately，therefore，there is conjoined to those necessities，whose remedies are remote and obscure，another necessity，which having a present and more obvious remedy，may justly be regarded as the first and original principle of human soci-ety。
There are different species of goods，which we are possessed of；the internal satis-faction of our minds，the external advantages of our body，and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and good fortune。We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first。The second may be ravished from us，but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them。The last only are both exposed to the vio-lence of others，and may be transferred without suffering any loss or alteration；while at the same time，there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one s desires and necessities。As the improvement，therefore，of these goods is the chief advantage of so-ciety，so the instability of their possession，along with their scarcity，is the chief imped-iment。
In vain should we expect to find，in uncultivated nature，a remedy to this incon-venience；or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind，which might controul those partial affections，and make us overcome the temptations arising from our circum-stances。The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose，or be taken for a natural principle，capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other。This we may observe in our common judgments concerning actions，where we blame a per-son，who either centers all his affections in his family，or is so regardless of them，as，in any opposition of interest，to give the preference to a stranger，or mere chance ac-quaintance。From all which it follows，that our natural uncultivated ideas of morality，instead of providing a remedy for the partiality of our affections，do rather conform them-selves to that partiality，and give it an additional force and influence。
The remedy，then，is not derived from nature，but from artifice；or more properly speaking，nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding，for what is ir-regular and incommodious in the affections。For when men，from their early education in society，have become sensible of the infinite advantages that result from it，and have be-sides acquired a new affection to company and conversation；and when they have ob-served，that the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods，which we call external，and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another；they must seek for a remedy by putting these goods，as far as possible，on the same footing with the fixed and constant advantages of the mind and body。This can be done after no other manner，than by a convention entered into by all the members of the society to be-stow stability on the possession of those external goods，and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry。By this means，every one knows what he may safely possess；and the passions are restrained in their partial and contradictory motions。Nor is such a restraint contrary to these pas-sions；for if so，it coued never be entered into，nor maintained；but it is only contraryto their heedless and impetuous movement。Instead of departing from our own interest，or from that of our nearest friends，by abstaining from the possessions of others，we can-not better consult both these interests，than by such a convention；because it is by that means we maintain society，which is so necessary to their well-being and subsistence，as well as to our own。
After this convention，concerning abstinence from the possessions of others，is en-tered into，and every one has acquired a stability in his possessions，there immediately arise the ideas of justice and injustice；as also those of property，right，and obligation。The latter are altogether unintelligible without first understanding the former。Our prop-erty is nothing but those goods，whose constant possession is established by the laws of society；that is，by the laws of justice。Those，therefore，who make use of the words property，or right，or obligation，before they have explained the origin of justice，or e-ven make use of them in that explication，are guilty of a very gross fallacy，and can nev-er reason upon any solid foundation。A man s property is some object related to him。This relation is not natural，but moral，and founded on justice。It is very preposterous，therefore，to imagine，that we can have any idea of property，without fully comprehen-ding the nature of justice，and shewing its origin in the artifice and contrivance of man。The origin of justice explains that of property。The same artifice gives rise to both。As our first and most natural sentiment of morals is founded on the nature of our passions，and gives the preference to ourselves and friends，above strangers；it is impossible there can be naturally any such thing as a fixed right or property，while the opposite passions of men impel them in contrary directions，and are not restrained by any convention or a-greement。
Here then is a proposition，which，I think，may be regarded as certain，that it is only from the selfishness and confined generosity of men，along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants，that justice derives its origin。If we look backward we shall find，that this proposition bestows an additional force on some of those observa-tions，which we have already made on this subject。
First，we may conclude from it，that a regard to public interest，or a strong exten-sive benevolence，is not our first and original motive for the observation of the rules of justice；since it is allowed，that if men were endowed with such a benevolence，these rules would never have been dreamt of。
Secondly，we may conclude from the same principle，that the sense of justice is notfounded on reason，or on the discovery of certain connexions and relations of ideas，which are eternal，immutable，and universally obligatory。For since it is confest，that such an alteration as that above-mentioned，in the temper and circumstances of man-kind，would entirely alter our duties and obligations，it is necessary upon the common system，that the sense of virtue is derived from reason，to shew the change which this must produce in the relations and ideas。But it is evident，that the only cause，why the extensive generosity of man，and the perfect abundance of every thing，would destroy the very idea of justice，is because they render it useless；and that，on the other hand，his confined benevolence，and his necessitous condition，give rise to that virtue，only by making it requisite to the publick interest，and to that of every individual。It was there-fore a concern for our own，and the publick interest，which made us establish the laws of justice；and nothing can be more certain，than that it is not any relation of ideas，which gives us this concern，but our impressions and sentiments，without which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us，and can never in the least affect us。The sense of justice，therefore，is not founded on our ideas，but on our impressions。
Thirdly，we may farther confirm the foregoing proposition，that those impressions，which give rise to this sense of justice，are not natural to the mind of man，but arise from artifice and human conventions。For since any considerable alteration of temper and circumstances destroys equally justice and injustice；and since such an alteration has an effect only by changing our own and the publick interest；it follows，that the first estab-lishment of the rules of justice depends on these different interests。But if men pursued the publick interest naturally，and with a hearty affection，they would never have dreamed of restraining each other by these rules；and if they pursued their own interest，without any precaution，they would run head-long into every kind of injustice and vio-lence。These rules，therefore，are artificial，and seek their end in an oblique and indi-rect manner；nor is the interest，which gives rise to them，of a kind that could be pur-sued by the natural and inartificial passions of men。
We come now to the second question we proposed，viz。Why we annex the idea of virtue to justice，and of vice to injustice。
After men have found by experience，that their selfishness and confined generosity，acting at their liberty，totally incapacitate them for society；and at the same time have observed，that society is necessary to the satisfaction of those very passions，they are naturally induced to lay themselves under the restraint of such rules，as may render theircommerce more safe and commodious。To the imposition then，and observance of these rules，both in general，and in every particular instance，they are at first induced only by a regard to interest；and this motive，on the first formation of society，is sufficiently strong and forcible。But when society has become numerous，and has encreased to a tribe or nation，this interest is more remote；nor do men so readily perceive，that disor-der and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules，as in a more narrow and con-tracted society。But though in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of that inter-est，which we have in maintaining order，and may follow a lesser and more present in-terest，we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive，either mediately or immediate-ly，from the injustice of others；as not being in that case either blinded by passion，or byass'd by any contrary temptation。Nay when the injustice is so distant from us，as no way to affect our interest，it still displeases us；because we consider it as prejudicial to human society，and pernicious to every one that approaches the person guilty of it。We partake of their uneasiness by sympathy；and as every thing，which gives uneasiness in human actions，upon the general survey，is called Vice，and whatever produces satis-faction，in the same manner，is denominated Virtue；this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice。And though this sense，in the present case，be derived only from contemplating the actions of others，yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions。The general rule reaches beyond those instances，from which it arose；while at the same time we naturally sympathize with others in the sentiments they entertain of us。Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establish-ment of justice：but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approba-tion，which attends that virtue。
What farther contributes to encrease their solidity，is the interest of our reputation，after the opinion，that a merit or demerit attends justice or injustice，is once firmly es-tablished among mankind。There is nothing，which touches us more nearly than our rep-utation，and nothing on which our reputation more depends than our conduct，with rela-tion to the property of others。For this reason，every one，who has any regard to his character，or who intends to live on good terms with mankind，must fix an inviolable law to himself，never，by any temptation，to be induced to violate those principles，which are essential to a man of probity and honour。