The Westerner observes this shift in what he regards as principles and suspects it。It is,however,an integral part of the conduct of life in Japan,whether in personal or in international relations。The Japanese sees that he has made an“error”in embarking on a course of action which does not achieve its goal。When it fails,he discards it as a lost cause,for he is not conditioned to pursue lost causes。

American administration of Japan under General MacArthur has accepted this Japa-nese ability to sail a new course。It has not impeded that course by insisting on using techniques of humiliation。It would have been culturally acceptable according to Western ethics if we had done so。For it is a tenet of Occidental ethics that humiliation and pun-ishment are effective means to bring about a wrongdoer's conviction of sin。Such admis-sion of sin is then a first step in his rehabilitation。The Japanese,as we have seen,state the issue in another way。Their ethic makes a man responsible for all the implications of his acts,and the natural consequences of an error should convince him of its undesira-bility。These natural consequences may even be defeat in an all-out war。But these are not situations which the Japanese must resent as humiliating。In the Japanese lexicon,a person or a nation humiliates another by detraction,ridicule,contempt,belittling,and insisting on symbols of dishonor。When the Japanese believe themselves humiliate,re-venge is a virtue。No matter how strongly Western ethics condemn such a tenet,the ef-fectiveness of American occupation of Japan depends on American self-restraint on this point。

The final victory of the United Sates again changed the situation for the Japanese。Their ultimate defeat brought about,as is usual in Japanese life,the abandonment of the course they had been pursuing。The peculiar ethic of the Japanese allowed them to wipe the slate clean。United Sates policy and General MacArthur's administration have avoi-ded writing fresh symbols of humiliation upon that washed slate,and have held simply to insisting on those things which in Japanese eyes are“natural consequences”of defeat。It has worked。

The retention of the Emperor has been of great importance。It has been handled well。It was the Emperor who called first upon General MacArthur,not MacArthur upon him,and this was an object lesson to the Japanese the force of which it is hard for West-erners to appreciate。It is said that when it was suggested to the Emperor that he disavow his divinity,he protested that it would be a personal embarrassment to strip himself of something he did not have。The Japanese,he said truthfully,did not consider him a god in the Western sense。MacArthur's Headquarters,however,urged upon him that the Occidental idea of his claim to divinity was bad for Japan's international repute,and the Emperor agreed to accept the embarrassment the disavowal would cost him。He spoke on New Year's Day,and asked to have all comments on his message translated for him from the world press。When he had read them,he sent a message to General MacArthur's Headquarters saying that he was satisfied。Foreigners had obviously not understood be-fore,and he was glad he had spoken。