'Yes.' 'But X walks through a whole day.' No, rather the words denote not what he walks through, but when he walks; just as when any one uses the words 'to drink the cup' he denotes not what he drinks, but the vessel out of which he drinks.Also, 'Is it either by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows?' 'Yes.'
'But suppose that of a pair of things he has discovered one and learned the other, the pair is not known to him by either method.' No:
'what' he knows, means' every single thing' he knows, individually;but this does not mean 'all the things' he knows, collectively.Again, there is the proof that there is a 'third man' distinct from Man and from individual men.But that is a fallacy, for 'Man', and indeed every general predicate, denotes not an individual substance, but a particular quality, or the being related to something in a particular manner, or something of that sort.Likewise also in the case of 'Coriscus' and 'Coriscus the musician' there is the problem, Are they the same or different?' For the one denotes an individual substance and the other a quality, so that it cannot be isolated;though it is not the isolation which creates the 'third man', but the admission that it is an individual substance.For 'Man' cannot be an individual substance, as Callias is.Nor is the case improved one whit even if one were to call the clement he has isolated not an individual substance but a quality: for there will still be the one beside the many, just as 'Man' was.It is evident then that one must not grant that what is a common predicate applying to a class universally is an individual substance, but must say that denotes either a quality, or a relation, or a quantity, or something of that kind.