If one is debarred from these defences one must pass to the argument that the conclusion has not been properly shown, approaching it in the light of the aforesaid distinction between the different kinds of fallacy.
In the case, then, of names that are used literally one is bound to answer either simply or by drawing a distinction: the tacit understandings implied in our statements, e.g.in answer to questions that are not put clearly but elliptically-it is upon this that the consequent refutation depends.For example, 'Is what belongs to Athenians the property of Athenians?' Yes.'And so it is likewise in other cases.But observe; man belongs to the animal kingdom, doesn't he?' Yes.'Then man is the property of the animal kingdom.' But this is a fallacy: for we say that man 'belongs to'
the animal kingdom because he is an animal, just as we say that Lysander 'belongs to' the Spartans, because he is a Spartan.It is evident, then, that where the premiss put forward is not clear, one must not grant it simply.