Individuals producing in a society, and hence the socially determined production of individuals, is of course the point of departure. The solitary and isolated hunter or fisherman, who serves Adam Smith and Ricardo as a starting point, is one of the unimaginative fantasies of 18th century romances a la Robinson Crusoe; and despite the assertions of social historians, these by no means signify simply a reaction against over-refinement and reversion to a misconceived natural life.
No more is Rousseau's _contrat social_, which by means of a contract establishes a relationship and connection between subjects that are by nature independent, at all based on this kind of naturalism. This is an illusion and nothing but the aesthetic illusion of the small and big Robinsonades. It is, on the contrary, the anticipation of "bourgeois society", which began to evolve in the 16th century and in the 18th century made giant strides towards maturity. The individual in this society of free competition seems to be rid of the natural ties etc.which made him an appurtenance of a particular, limited aggregation of human beings in previous historical epochs. The prophets of the 18th century, on whose shoulders Adam Smith and Ricardo were still wholly standing, envisaged this individual -- a product of the dissolution of feudal society on the one hand and the productive forces evolved since the 16th century on the other -- as an ideal whose existence belongs to the past. They saw this individual not as a historical result, but as the starting-point of history; not as something evolving in the course of history, but posited by nature, because for them this individual was in conformity with nature, in keeping with their idea of human nature.
This delusion has been characteristic of every new epoch hitherto.
Steuart, who in some respects was in opposition to the 18th century, and, as an aristocrat, tended rather to regard things from a historical standpoint, avoided this naive view.
The further back we trace the course of history, the more does the individual, and accordingly also the producing individual, appear to be dependent and to belong to a larger whole. At first, the individual in a still quite natural manner is part of the family and of the tribe which evolves from the family; later, he is part of a community, of one of the different forms of community which arise from the conflict and the merging of tribes. It is not until the 18th century that, in the bourgeois society, the various forms of the social texture confront the individual as merely means toward his private ends, as external necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, namely that of the isolated individual, is precisely the epoch of the (as yet) most highly-developed social (according to this standpoint, general)relations. Man is a "zoon politikon" [social animal] in the most literal sense: he is not only a social animal, but an animal that can individualize himself only within society. Production by an isolated individual outside society -- a rare event, which might occur when a civilized person who has already absorbed the dynamic social forces is accidentally cast into the wilderness -- is just as preposterous as the development of speech without individuals who live _together_ and talk to one another. It is unnecessary to dwell upon this point further. It need not have been mentioned at all, if this inanity, which had rhyme and reason in the works of 18th century writers, were not expressly introduced once more into modern political economy by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon, etc. It is of course very pleasant for Proudhon, for instance, to be able to explain the origin of an economic relationship -- whose historical evolution he does not know -- in an historico-philosophical manner by means of mythology; alleging that Adam or Prometheus hit upon the ready-made idea, which was then put into practice, etc. Nothing is more tedious and dull than the commonplace phantasies of _locus communis_.
Thus, when we speak of production, we always have in mind production at a definite stage of social development -- of production by individuals in a society. It might therefore seems that, in order to speak of production at all, we must either trace the various phases in the historical process of development, or else declare from the very beginning that we are examining _one_ particular historical period, as for instance modern bourgeois production, which is, indeed, our real subject matter. All periods of production, however, have certain features in common; they have certain common categories. _Production in general_ is an abstraction, but a sensible abstraction in so far as it actually emphasizes and defines the common aspects and thus avoids repetition. Yet this _general_ concept, or the common aspect which has been brought to light by comparison, is itself a multifarious compound comprising divergent categories. Some elements are found in all epochs, others are common to a few epochs. The most modern period and the most ancient period will have [certain] categories in common. Production without them is inconceivable. But, although the most highly-developed languages have laws and categories in common with the most primitive languages, it is precisely their divergence from these general and common features which constitutes their development. It is necessary to distinguish these definitions which apply to production in general, in order not to overlook the essential differences existing despite the unity that follows from the very fact that the subject (mankind) and object (nature) are the same. For instance, on failure to perceive this fact depends the entire wisdom of modern economists who prove the eternity and harmony of existing social relations. For example, no production is possible without an instrument of production, even if this instrument is simply the hand. It is not possible without past, accumulated labor, even if this labor is only the skill acquired by repeated practice and concentrated in the hand of a savage. Capital is, among other things, also an instrument of instrument of production, and also past, materialized labor. Consequently, capital is a universal and eternal relation given by nature -- that is, provided one omits precisely those specific factors which turn the "instrument of production" or "accumulated labor" into capital. The whole history of the relations of production thus appears, for instance in Carey's writings, as a falsification malevolently brought about by government.